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CINEMA
A Reﬂection on How the Film Industry
Promotes Itself
Searle Kochberg
Introduction
Cinema-going as a social phenomenon is over 100 years old. Such was its
exponential growth in the ﬁrst few decades that what started out as a pragmatic
way of demonstrating new moving-image technologies very quickly mushroomed
into a hugely popular leisure activity attracting tens of millions people per week in
the US sector alone (Balio 1976: 75). In the process, an institutional infrastructure
grew up to streamline the commercial exploitation of this new mass medium of
entertainment. This chapter sets out to reﬂect upon this exploitation by considering
how the ﬁlm industry has promoted itself from the 1930s to the present day; like
all good yarns with plenty of twists and turns, it is always best to start with the basic
‘setup’.
The challenge for all in the industry is to get ﬁlms ﬁnanced, promoted and put
in front of a large audience. This translates as the three-branch division of the ﬁlm
industry, one that has remained intact since the earliest days of ﬁlm exploitation.
This three-branch division is made up of distribution (marketing, promotion, sales),
exhibition (cinemas) and production (manufacturing). Money changes hands at
every stage, with promotion focused mainly at the distribution and exhibition ends.
For this reason, it is these two branches of the ﬁlm industry which will be the main
focus of this chapter. Today, very large distribution ﬁrms take the biggest slice of
each pie. As ﬁnanciers-cum-distributors, they dictate for the most part the ﬁnancial
details of a ﬁlm’s production, exploitation and rental to cinemas – namely, who
gets what of the box oﬃce receipts. The chapter moves historically through three
key economic phases of the US (global) and UK ﬁlm industries, starting just after
infancy and adolescence (1895 to circa 1925), by which time the ﬁlm business had
evolved a ‘mature’, integrated economic structure. The three phases of our study
are the ‘Studio Era’ (late 1920s to 1950s), the ‘TV Era’ (1950s to 1990s) and the
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‘Digital Era’ (1990s to present). Snapshots will be taken at key points en route, with
case studies pulled out to highlight the salient points of each stage.
The Studio Era (late 1920s to 1950s)
By the late 1920s/early 1930s, ﬁve ‘studios’, known as the ‘Big Five’ or the
‘Majors’, eﬀectively controlled the US and Canadian market. These companies
were Warner Brothers, Fox (in the mid-1930s reorganized and renamed Twentieth
Century Fox), Paramount, Metro Goldwyn Mayer and Radio Keith Orpheum
(RKO, through which Disney distributed: see below). The Majors were vertically
integrated (owning their own production facilities, marketing/promotion organi-
zations and cinemas), and operated as an oligopoly (a group monopoly). The 1930s
and 1940s were decades when up to 100 million cinema tickets were sold in North
America each week. Collectively, the Majors accounted for around 75 per cent of
ﬁlm rentals to cinemas in the US sector, this despite owning only 15 per cent of
US-sector cinemas. There are two key reasons for this. Firstly, the cinemas that the
Majors owned were deluxe single ‘screens’: large 1200-plus capacity houses, in the
best urban and suburban locations in the US and Canada. These houses naturally
had high ticket prices and in an era before TV, there was no problem ﬁlling seats.
Frequent ﬁlm goers were understood in that era as people going to the movies ﬁve
times or more per week and ﬁlms were needed to satisfy their insatiable appetites.
If individual members of the ‘studio’ oligopoly could not supply the huge numbers
of ﬁlms required to ﬁll these deluxe cinemas 52 weeks of the year, and they
couldn’t, the Big 5 collectively came up with a simple solution to maintain control
and maximize proﬁts. They ﬁlled their slots as much as possible with each other’s
ﬁlms. It was a trade-oﬀ: ‘You scratch my back and I’ll scratch yours.’
Secondly, ‘independent’ owners of big-revenue deluxe cinemas (i.e., those not
owned by the Big Five) had their hands tied. If they wanted the Majors’ ﬁlms, they
were forced to take sight-unseen blocks of ‘studio’ ﬁlms or they would be denied
the ﬁlms altogether (a practice referred to as block-booking). By this point along
the food chain there was little left of the market to carve up, but three smaller US
ﬁlm companies owning no cinemas, Columbia, United Artists and Universal
(known as the ‘Little Three’), accounted for a further 20 per cent of cinema rentals.
This left a meagre 5 per cent of rentals for even smaller domestic distributors and
foreign companies (Gomery 1986: 11–18). During the 1930s, rentals of ﬁlms of the
Big Five and the Little Three dominated international sectors as well, particularly
in Europe and Japan. The Hollywood oligopoly was very successful in setting up
international marketing operations to promote their ﬁlms, and because the ﬁlms
had usually made back their cost in the US sector already, all was proﬁt. It is
estimated that one half of the box oﬃce rentals for US ﬁlms was generated in
overseas markets in peace time during the Studio Era (Gomery 1986: 12). Thus,
the Majors set in motion a huge revenue stream that was tightly under their con-
trol. Systems of economic control tend to be self-reinforcing and by virtue of their
ﬁlms beating the competition with bigger budgets and bigger star names, secured
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through long-term contracts, the Majors further consolidated their control of the
marketplace. Simply put, their ﬁlms were the ones that the public generally saw,
were familiar with and wanted to see: brand loyalty through apparent consumer
choice.
Yet, despite a less than crowded leisure industry at the time, ﬁlm companies
were not automatically assured an audience. They had to build one utilizing var-
ious marketing tools: promotion (paid advertising that is produced by the ﬁlm
company itself), publicity (free advertising through, for instance, the planting of
stories in newspapers and fan magazines), tie-ins (mutually beneﬁcial promotional
liaisons between ﬁlms and other consumer products, often ﬁltered through per-
sonalities) and merchandising (where manufacturers pay a ﬁlm company to use a
ﬁlm title or image on their products).
Case study 1: Warner Brothers, MGM, Twentieth
Century Fox and Disney: Hollywood promotion, stars and
the Studio Era
Even before the 1930s, marketing was a well-embedded procedure in Hollywood.
To promote the latest production of its biggest star, the dog Rin Tin Tin, Warner
Brothers distributed promotional materials for Where the North Begins (1923) to
theatre owners, including ads, guidelines for publicity stunts, including stopping
pedestrians on the street, and stories to plant in local newspapers. Merchandising,
too, was piloted in the exploitation of the dog, with endorsement deals with Ken
L-Ration, the ﬁrst commercial dog food in the US (OrLean 2011: 36, 38).
By the 1930s, big money was beginning to change hands, with large contractual
agreements being signed between the Majors and consumer-product manu-
facturers. MGM is a good example to cite because of all the Majors, it had the
most to gain by eﬀective marketing. Of all the Big Five, it had the least number of
cinemas. This meant that building brand loyalty and renting its ﬁlms to non-
MGM cinemas were particularly important issues in MGM’s corporate survival. It
is no coincidence, therefore, that its marketing arm became recognized as the
industry leader, both nationally and internationally, during the Studio Era. In
March 1933, MGM signed a $500,000 tie-in contract with Coca-Cola, where
Coke ads would employ pictures and endorsements of MGM stars, with notice of
recent ﬁlm releases. In the same year, Coca-Cola delivery trucks across the country
carried billboards advertising the studio’s biggest production, Dinner at Eight. It
would seem that the contract also allowed for product placement in the ﬁlms
themselves, as evidenced in two 1938 blockbusters (or ‘A’ ﬁlms, as they were
referred to then). MGM’s ﬁrst Technicolor feature, the musical Sweethearts, uses the
new colour process to mark the debut of the red ‘Drink Coca-Cola’ neon sign in
Times Square. Elsewhere that year, in the more macho surroundings of Test Pilot,
Spencer Tracy is heard ordering ‘Two Coca-Colas please.’
The corporate logic behind branding has always been that consumers (here read
ﬁlmgoers) ‘attach’ themselves to a brand because of what they hope it says about
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them, a form of fantasy or, to use a Marxist concept, a form of false consciousness,
where economic and social relations in bourgeois societies are rendered false to
individuals. For female spectators of the 1930s and 1940s, MGM fostered this
aspirational culture through its very strong roster of female stars. To promote the
MGM brand, the studio saw to it that its ﬁlms became showcases for fashion, fur-
niture design and cosmetics. An amusing example of this is related by Charles
Eckert (1978: 6) who cites a story from the Saturday Evening Post (18 May 1935)
tracking the merchandising history of a dress designed by Adrian for Joan Crawford
in the 1932 ﬁlm Letty Lynton. The MGM copyright of the design, noted for its big
stiﬀ ruﬄes outlining the shoulders, was marketed up and down 7th Avenue, start-
ing with high-end manufacturers and ending with mass production ﬁrms. By 1935
the dress had reached the other side of the Pond, dominating even the cheap prêt a
porter shops of Paris, much to the chagrin of the writer on the Saturday Evening Post.
Eckert ends his article with the wry observation that Hollywood in the Studio Era
‘did as much or more than any other force in capitalist culture to smooth the
operation of the production-consumption cycle by fetishizing products and putting
the libido into … advertising’ (Eckert 1978: 21).
Still, during the 1930s, the public appeal of child actress Shirley Temple, then
the world’s biggest star and ‘the’ icon of Depression America, was exploited to the
full by Twentieth Century Fox, her studio, to promote its brand. A merchandising
deal was struck with Ideal Toy and Novelty Company to produce the Shirley
Temple doll, available in 13 diﬀerent sizes. Despite the dire state of the economy
in the mid-1930s, 0.5 to 1 million of these dolls were sold, launching a multi-
million dollar toy bonanza. Speciﬁc tie-ins, linking consumer products with parti-
cular ﬁlms, to promote both were also launched. For example, print adverts for the
Packard motor car were linked to the release of Temple’s Captain January (1936).
By the following year, the Disney studio was signing 70 (merchandising) licensing
agreements to coincide with the release of its ﬁrst animated feature, Snow White and
the Seven Dwarfs (1938). ‘Snow White toys, books, clothes, snacks and records’
were manufactured to coincide with the ﬁlm’s opening (Schlosser 2002: 40). To
use James McNeal’s term, the ‘Kid Kustomer’ had come of age (cited in Schlosser
2002: 44). Disney and Twentieth Century Fox had proven that allying themselves
with reliable children’s and adult’s consumer goods, reﬂecting solid American
family values, only reinforced their corporate brands and paid handsome dividends
to shareholders.
Case study 2: The UK’s vertically integrated Rank Organization
takes on the Hollywood oligopoly during the Studio Era
The only ‘Major’ vertically integrated ﬁlm company in the UK during the Studio
Era was the Rank Organization. Its attempt to break into the US market from the
mid- to late 1940s is the most striking example we have of a non-US ﬁlm com-
pany trying to build an American audience for its ﬁlms during the Studio Era.
However, Rank’s attempt, despite some limited success, ultimately proved to be a
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failure and was all the more disappointing given Rank’s economic clout in the
US. The company was enormously powerful, in the same league as the US
Majors. It had a controlling interest in Universal, which gave it access to the
cinemas of the oligopoly. However, despite all these advantages and Rank spend-
ing enormous sums on its prestige ﬁlms, few of its ﬁlms found favour in the
US. When they did (as did Caesar and Cleopatra and Henry V, both 1945, and
Hamlet and The Red Shoes, both 1948), it was because they featured stars known to
Americans, had excellent production values and were marketed carefully and at
great cost as ‘road show’ (special event) presentations (Curran and Porter
1983: 164–178). However, these marketing strategies were too expensive and
unrealistic to adopt universally and Rank’s gate-crash experiment was over by the
end of the 1940s.
As a footnote to the Studio Era, the construction of a ‘trust’ such as the Majors’
oligopoly, where a group of companies operate together in the marketplace to
control a commodity, was/is entirely illegal in the US. The reason usually given,
however, for its resilience is the federal government’s reluctance to rock the boat
during the Depression (1930s) and World War II (1941 to 1945). Hollywood
movies were needed to boost morale. However, by 1949 the game was up. An
anti-trust suit was brought by the Justice Department against Paramount Pictures.
The court found in favour of the Justice Department, against Paramount. The
terms of the court order (or ‘consent decree’) agreed between the plaintiﬀ and
the defendant were the selling oﬀ of Paramount’s cinemas and an end to block
booking. Subsequently the other Majors also settled with the government. The
monopoly was over.
The TV Era (1950s to 1990s)
By the mid-1950s, the ﬁlm industry was struggling. The Majors had been forced to
sell oﬀ their cinema chains by the US government. Competition to get ﬁlms into
cinemas was now rife and ‘Independents’ (independent production companies)
were beating the Majors at their own game. They were simply quicker on their
feet than the large lumbering studios as the Independents had little in the way of
ﬁxed costs to pay for (such as a 24/7 studio infrastructure) and could therefore
make ﬁlms faster and cheaper. They could hire what they needed on a ﬁlm-by-
ﬁlm basis, such as ex-’Studio’ stars who had been released from their long-term
Studio contracts, and pay them through incentives such as percentage-of-proﬁt
deals instead of upfront salaries. Ironically, their cost-cutting, their renting of studio
space and their general ﬂexibility made independent producers very attractive
to the Majors, who by the mid-1950s were lining up to ﬁnance and distribute
their ﬁlms.
In the end the big bugbear was not the consent decrees but TV. It had usurped
ﬁlm as the leading medium of mass entertainment by the mid-1950s. The ﬁlm
industry went through a period of denial, trying to convince itself that the humble
TV set could never compete with the majesty of cinema, particularly with an
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industry investing in widescreen, stereophonic sound, 3D and colour. But
cinema proﬁts continued to fall dramatically. By 1956, weekly ﬁlm attendance
ﬁgures in US and Canada were half what they had been at their Studio Era
peak, down to 46.5 million (Bernstein 1957: 2). The Majors, whose corporate
boards were largely made up of ‘old boys’ from a bygone era, were missing the
point: the bigger picture. Social habits had changed since the war. People who had
‘never had it so good’ were having children, moving to the suburbs, enjoying
being at home, DIY-ing. They were choosing to spend their leisure time
diﬀerently.
Eventually the ﬁlm industry responded accordingly and in 1956, Columbia,
Twentieth Century Fox, MGM, Warner Brothers and Universal released many
of their pre-1948 features to TV. In 1958, Paramount followed suit and sold
750 features to the Music Corporation of America (MCA), a major producer of
(ﬁlmed) TV programming. By 1959 MCA had purchased Universal, thus setting in
motion the beginning of a multiplatform marketing/distribution system for ﬁlm.
By the mid-1970s, new distribution windows had arrived in the form of the
videocassette recorder and cable television. By the mid-1980s, cable pay-per-view
and cable premium channels were added to the list of distribution windows (Balio
1990: 235–256).
Henceforth, the TV Era exploitation of ﬁlm, with its increasing emphasis on
new distribution windows, was marked by a shift in corporate strategy of the
Majors to the role of ﬁnancier-cum-distributor. Only they had the experience and
money to market and promote ﬁlms globally in a new cross-platform marketplace.
They therefore came to reassume the dominant role in the ﬁlm industry by
determining a ﬁlm’s ﬁnance (expenditures, marketing, distribution deals with
producers) and a ﬁlm’s exploitation.
First, in cinemas:
 determining whether a ﬁlm’s run was exclusive (a ﬁlm screened in one theatre)
or multiple (a ﬁlm screened at a number of theatres simultaneously) or saturation
(a ﬁlm screened in upwards of 1000k screens at the same time);
 setting the agenda for the length of the ﬁlm’s engagement in particular cinemas,
the agenda for a cinema’s advertising campaign and the ﬁnancial spilt of box
oﬃce takings.
Then in down-the-line distribution windows:
 By 1990, the typical pattern of release for a ‘blockbuster’ (a big budget ﬁlm),
usually an adventure ﬁlm genre appealing to the frequent ﬁlm-goer, a 16- to
24-year-old male, looked something like this:
 theatrical window: 0 to 6 months;
 video window: 6 months + (open ended);
 pay-per-view window: 9 to 12 months;
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 cable TV: 12 to 30 months;
 network TV: 30 to 60 months;
 syndicated TV: 60 months +.
The theatrical presentation would continue to remain the most important
distribution window because of the prestige aﬀorded to a ﬁlm’s theatrical release:
premieres, press junkets (post-screening one-on-one publicity interview marathons
between the media and a production’s director and lead actors), critical reviews,
industry awards, all increasing the value of the ﬁlm with respect to other distribution
windows (rental agreements, etc.).
Case study 3: The Seven Year Itch (1955) – Twentieth
Century Fox marketing team respond to the challenge of
TV: Iconic stars
By the early 1950s, the strategic advantage enjoyed by the Majors during the
Studio Era was over. There was no longer a guaranteed market for their ﬁlms.
They had to compete with independent productions for cinema slots while at the
same time having to meet huge ﬁxed studio costs which the Independents didn’t
incur. Meanwhile, American audiences were staying at home and watching TV in
ever-increasing numbers. In response, ﬁlm companies focused their energies on
promoting the diﬀerence between their screen product and the (free) TV one.
Indeed, it would be a few years before the Majors changed strategy and started
doing big business with TV. Twentieth Century Fox’s 1952 solution to TV was its
widescreen process, ‘Cinemascope’, accompanied for the most part by colour and
stereophonic sound. Its ﬁlms were now going to be events, with marketing/
promotion as important as the production values. The company’s big summer
release of 1955, The Seven Year Itch, was shot in Cinemascope, colour and recorded
in stereo, as one would expect. What was less expected was the astute decision by
the studio to turn the location shoot into a marketing bonanza.
The script called for the ﬁlm’s star, Marilyn Monroe, to be photographed on
location outside a cinema in Midtown, Manhattan. What made this particular
15 September 1954 shoot most unusual was that several hundred press photo-
graphers were invited along to help promote the event, particularly Marilyn’s
white dress billowing above a subway grating. After the shoot, Fox selected its best
production stills to be used for press releases or to be blown up as posters for
cinema marquees. For the 1955 summer premiere of the movie, a huge four-storey
version of one of the billowing-dress stills was selected as the logotype for the ﬁlm
(a graphic that gives ‘identity’ to a brand, in this case Twentieth Century Fox). The
monumentality of widescreen, of poster, of star all came together as mutually
reinforcing elements to create an iconic stamp for the movie. With the huge blow-
up of the billowing dress hovering over many of the nation’s ticket booths, the
ﬁlm’s box oﬃce was outstanding: the gross ﬁgure in the US/Canada sector alone
was $12 million (IMDb).
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Critics at the time were quick to put the enormous popularity of The Seven Year
Itch down to Marilyn’s performance/star image. That image, which was greatly
enhanced by the billowing-dress photo, was marked by the sociocultural context of
its making: a mixture of the new liberated female subject, borne out of the
experience of young women during World War II, and a hyper-feminine persona/
body-object of the 1950s, a product of the censure of the Eisenhower
Era. Already, in 1953, the publication of Alfred Kinsey’s candid ‘scientiﬁc’ report
on American female sexuality had appeared. That same year, a nude photo of
Marilyn, taken in 1948, was used as the centrefold in the ﬁrst edition of Playboy
magazine. The billowing-dress Marilyn logotype taps into this zeitgeist. In mar-
keting terms, Twentieth Century Fox was consciously building its brand on
‘pillars’, branding strategies, values and audience demographics that exploited ten-
sions evident in the social discourse of the age. As ‘the’ female body image of the
1950s, Marilyn’s ﬁgure moves across ﬁlm and print media, seemingly free to
express itself, while at the same time encoded by the censure of post-war
patriarchal advertising. This logotype is truly an American myth in the making,
apparently reconciling social dilemmas that cannot be reconciled in real life (Dyer
1987: 19–66).
Over time the billowing-dress logotype has been reproduced so much that
its meaning bleeds way beyond the ﬁlm that generated it. As a linguistic sign, its
meaning is at once very dense and very diﬀuse. To some it clearly denotes
Monroe, to others it connotes aspects of 1950s American media and advertising,
and to others broader aspects of gender politics. The list goes on and on. It might
be useful here to refer to Baudrillard’s notion of the simulacrum, where in his
analysis of postmodern consumer society he argues that ‘endless networks of media
and advertising images. … precede any reality to which they might be said to refer’
(Childers and Hentzi 1995: 280). Applied to this example, an online search today
for the Marilyn logotype will likely take us on any number of digital ‘journeys’ to a
huge variety of sites. Very quickly, a search for the billowing dress can generate
almost ‘endless networks’ of signiﬁcation, with no obvious beginning or end, no
clear point of source and no end point. Networks of signiﬁers are generated that
have no clear referent.
Case study 4: Jaws (1975) – Hollywood ﬁlm promotion and
distribution: The dawn of a new era
In 1973, two independent producers working out of Universal Pictures, Richard
Zanuck and David Brown, acquired the screen rights to Jaws. By early 1975,
Universal (the ﬁnancier-cum-distributor of the ﬁlm) was collaborating with
Bantam (the publisher of the paperback version of the book) on a highly innova-
tive promotion to accompany the immanent publication of the paperback and the
release of the ﬁlm. Both ﬁlm distributor and paperback publisher immediately
recognized the mutual beneﬁts of a joint promotion strategy. For both, the end
goal was the exploitation of the Jaws brand to the full. To achieve this, a
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cross-media logotype was developed, designed to appear on the cover of the
paperback and on all the ﬁlm’s advertising. Later, producers Zanuck and Brown
‘embarked on a 6-city tour sponsored by Bantam Books’ to promote the publica-
tion of the paperback and to build audiences for the soon-to-be released ﬁlm (Daly
1980: 114).
It is diﬃcult to label Jaws a blockbuster exactly, as it wasn’t funded as such from
the onset; but once the book was established as a bestseller, the ﬁlm’s release was
handled as if it were. What Universal came up with for the ﬁlm’s release in June
1975 was to mark the dawn of a new era in the promotion and distribution of
Hollywood’s ‘big’ ﬁlms. For the ﬁrst time the exploitation of a movie incorporated
a ‘wide’ release pattern in cinemas, opening in 464 theatre screens on 20 June 1975
across the US and Canada. This was accompanied by a nationwide media campaign
on a massive scale: in the days leading up to the ﬁlm’s release (speciﬁcally 18 to
20 June 1975), Universal funded a media blitz of approximately 25 30-second ads
per night on primetime TV. The logic behind the strategy was to create maximum
visibility for the ﬁlm as quickly as possible in order to recoup production/
distribution costs as soon as possible. It is clear that the strategy paid oﬀ hand-
somely. ‘Jaws made 14 million dollars its 1st week in release … [and] as of
September 5, 1975, Universal declared Jaws the all-time box-oﬃce champion’
(Daly 1980: 124–125).
The Jaws ﬁgures in summary are as follows:
 production costs: $8 million;
 pre-opening marketing/promotion costs: $1.8 million (including $700,000 for
18 to 20 June TV blitz);
 opening weekend: $7,061,513 (US: IMDb) (22 June 1975) (464 screens);
 theatrical gross: $430,510,134 (worldwide: IMDb).
Universal also exploited tie-ins and merchandising to increase proﬁts:
In eight weeks over a half million Jaws t-shirts, 2 million plastic tumblers, and
2 hundred thousand soundtrack record albums were sold. The Jaws Log, a
quickly produced paperback about the making of the ﬁlm, sold over 1 million
copies in the ﬁrst month … .
(Daly 1980: 137–138)
Even allowing for the fact that not all of the promotion strategy was new, what is
clear from this case study is that Jaws marks the birth of the Modern Era in ﬁlm
marketing and promotion. What was truly innovative about the strategy was the
combination of pre-opening cross-media branding, TV blitz marketing and
saturation booking. Previously ‘big’ ﬁlms had opened in exclusive runs in deluxe
locations only – for example, Times Square, New York, and Leicester Square,
London. This basic structure has remained the cornerstone for blockbuster
promotion campaigns ever since.
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Case study 5: The Crying Game (1992) – Miramax promotion
strategy and the art of building an audience
The marketing/promotion strategy for The Crying Game is a classic example of
how to build an audience for a low-budget ‘oﬀ-centre’ ﬁlm (mainstream ﬁlm but
not ‘blockbuster’) in the pre-Digital Era. The Crying Game was a Miramax ‘pick-up’,
a ﬁlm that it did not ﬁnance, but one for which it acquired the US distribution
rights after the production was completed. In the spring of 1992, this largely UK
pack-of-cards co-production, where each source of funding depends on the parti-
cipation of the others, was picked up by Miramax for US distribution. The diﬃcult
themes of the picture, race, cross-dressing, transgressive sexuality, IRA ‘terrorist’
cells meant that this was a ﬁlm that was not going to be a straightforward market-
ing campaign. Miramax had to ﬁnd the ﬁlm’s ‘natural’ audience ﬁrst and then build
on that. The UK distributors of the ﬁlm, Mayfair, had failed to do this by rushing
too quickly to a wide release pattern. The net result: the ﬁlm failed at the UK box
oﬃce. Miramax would not make the same mistake. The strategy it came up with
was to prove so eﬀective that even today elements of it are used as ‘the’ classic
model for an oﬀ-centre ﬁlm promotion.
To garner critical interest and to create a buzz around the ﬁlm, Miramax
screened the ﬁlm at the Telluride, Toronto and New York Film Festivals. It then
released it to a limited number of US cinemas at the end of November 1992. To
promote the ﬁlm, Miramax borrowed the one successful element from the UK
marketing campaign, enlisting the media in a conspiracy of silence, not to give the
ﬁlm’s secret away. But Miramax added an extra twist: the audience was also
involved in the conspiracy. The ﬁlm was promoted using the slogan: ‘The movie
everyone is talking about, but no one is giving away its secrets.’ This both ﬁred the
imagination of the ﬁlm-going public and neatly avoided the problem of drawing
too much attention to the diﬃcult themes of the ﬁlm. The release pattern started
very modestly, the ﬁlm opening in only six screens in the US. But as audience
interest mounted, the release pattern went ‘wide’: by early February 1993, the ﬁlm
was playing on 239 US/Canada screens. Later that month, the ﬁlm received six
Oscar nominations: it was now playing on 500 screens. By the week preceding the
Oscars, the number of US/Canada screens showing the ﬁlm was in excess of 1000,
such was the momentum of the campaign.
Miramax had originally picked up the US distribution of The Crying Game in the
spring of 1992 for a paltry $1.5 million. By 1997, the total gross US box-oﬃce
ﬁgure was around $68 million (Giles 1997: 50). However, the ﬁlm’s US success
was a hollow victory for the UK producers. None of the monies found their way
back to them. Only the US based distributors, Miramax, were the winners.
Case study 6: Trainspotting (1996) – building a UK youth
audience for an off-centre ﬁlm
Leaving the miseries of the UK marketing strategy of The Crying Game behind, a
classic UK/Euro marketing success is the campaign for the low-budget UK
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co-production Trainspotting. As the ﬁlm’s UK theatrical and video distributor,
Polygram, a multimedia Dutch entertainment group, set itself the challenge of
widening the ﬁlm’s ‘natural’ appeal beyond the cult status of the Irvine Welsh
book on which the ﬁlm was based. If the budget of the ﬁlm was typically low for a
UK TV-ﬁnanced ﬁlm (Channel 4 and co-producers had spent £1.5 million), the
marketing budget was atypically high. Polygram spent £800,000 marketing the
ﬁlm in the UK.
The challenge was to tap the mass youth audience, the 16- to 24-year-old
multiplex audience, and a marketing campaign was designed to do just that. Poly-
gram utilized its expertise in the music industry, marketing the ﬁlm like a record
album release. A graphic design team was brought in to create the ﬁlm’s (now)
distinctive look, the Trainspotting logotype, bright orange graphics/typesetting
mixed with black-and-white portraits of the cast. This logotype was ubiquitous in
the cross-media exploitation of the ﬁlm: for cinema release, for the CD, for print-
media advertising (e.g., youth ‘style’ magazines) and for video. By supporting the
brand the way it did, it gave Trainspotting a strong brand identity. Then the pro-
motional trailer brought the ‘accent-on-youth’ pillar of the marketing campaign to
a crescendo, with its emphasis on the ﬁlm’s humour and Britpop music track. The
strategic emphasis on a broad youth market paid oﬀ handsomely. The ﬁlm found
its audience and became a major domestic and international hit. The UK box
oﬃce alone was £12.3 million (IMDb).
The Digital Era (1990s to the present)
Looking back it is easy to see that the Hollywood of the 1950s made the near-fatal
error of misreading its business. It wasn’t only in the business of making ﬁlms, but
also in the business of providing entertainment and it needed to follow its custo-
mers. Had it done so, it might have embraced TV earlier, reconﬁgured itself as
‘multi-media’ and seen proﬁts rise. Instead, it stuck rather doggedly to a policy of
‘we make movies’ (investing in 3D, widescreen and stereophonic sound) and saw
proﬁts fall for years (Levitt 2011: 42–43).
By the mid-1990s, however, the Majors as ﬁnanciers-cum-distributors again
dominated the Industry. Distribution windows for ﬁlm ran from theatrical release,
through the video home system (VHS), to pay-per-view cable/satellite, to standard
cable/satellite, to network TV and ﬁnally to syndicated TV. The year 1996 saw the
arrival of the latest tier in home ﬁlm distribution, the digital versatile disc (DVD).
This new digital system was designed to compete with VHS, which it very quickly
superseded. As early as 2001 the DVD market was growing at ten times that of the
VHS market. Digital technology oﬀered vastly superior image and sound, and
increased storage capacity; and DVD was cross-platform, that is to say it could run
on multiple types of hardware systems.
Such was the economic importance of DVD that it soon led to a rethinking of
the exploitation strategy behind the Majors’ distribution of their ﬁlms. Henceforth
there was a closing of the (time) gap between the theatrical release date and the
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next, DVD, window. Today the typical distribution cycle for a studio ﬁlm in the
US is as follows:
 theatrical window: 0 to 4 months;
 DVD window: 4 months + (open for an indeﬁnite period);
 video-on-demand (VOD)/pay-per-view window: 5 months +;
 VOD is followed by a premium cable/satellite channel window (for approximately
one year), which precedes free-to-air television, etc.
1999 to 2004 proved to be the golden years of DVD marketing and sales, with the
DVD release of the blockbuster Gladiator (November 2000) marking a major
watershed. The DVD two-disc set included audio commentary, deleted scenes, a
behind-the-scenes documentary, a theatre trailer and a history of gladiatorial games.
In anticipation of huge sales, prior to its release date, 2.6 million copies of the DVD
were shipped to retail outlets in the US/Canada sector. Eventually, DVD sales
reached 4.5 million units worldwide, the best-selling DVD up to that point.
From the vantage point of 2012, pundits now forecast the future of ﬁlm
exploitation with only two main distribution windows: the theatrical window and
VOD. DVD sales are falling every year. If the theatrical release continues to be
paramount in a ﬁlm’s commercial exploitation strategy, due to the status and
prestige associated with a theatrical premiere, its publicity and its critical reviews, it
is the wider picture of converging digital entertainment technologies that is the
focus of attention for most companies.
The industry more than understands that it is in the entertainment business, all
of it: at home, out of the home, in ﬁlm, TV, games, digital design, animation,
digital print, music, merchandising, tie-ins, online, oﬄine, Smartphone, PC and
MAC. Financing-cum-distribution occurs across the media technologies, of which
(digital) ﬁlm is but one. Seen in this light, the recent interest in digital 3D tech-
nology is not just a re-tread of the 1950s all over again. It is a logical, in many
senses ideal, cross-platform technology, equally at home across a range of hardware
devices. Today, multi-media conglomerates put big money into attracting their
main customer base to the local multiplex, the 12- to 24-year-old male customer
segment, who it turns out is also the main customer for any down-the-line asso-
ciated digital software (Rust et al 2011: 2–3). Any media corporation worth its salt
must build a relationship with this viewer-cum-user or ‘viewser’. As the courtship
progresses, corporate marketing personnel push products and brands, theirs and tie-
ins, using the ‘nudge factor’ or ‘leverage’. Much of this is done online. A recent
example of such a strategy was the collaboration between Twentieth Century Fox
and Rovio, an entertainment media company based in Finland specializing in
games for touch-screen Smartphones. The two corporations collaborated on the
animated feature Rio (2011), with Rovio producing a new version of its popular
mobile game Angry Birds, now christened Angry Birds Rio, to promote the feature
ﬁlm and its own social-gaming business. A tie-in was thus established to the mutual
beneﬁt of both corporations, with Rovio’s social gaming proving an ideal digital
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marketing tool to promote Rio to a viewser generation of movie-goers. Angry Birds
Rio was launched in March 2011 and the ﬁlm, Rio, released one month later.
Angry Birds Rio hit 10 million downloads in the ﬁrst ten days of its launch (nma.co.
uk, posted 26 May 2011) and by September 2011 Rio grossed $143,618,384 at the
US/Canada box oﬃce alone (IMDb).
In the new converging media marketplace, branding and promotion experts
have seen their control over the construction of meaning of a ﬁlm increase. In
this panacea of endless media and advertising images, it is the marketing team that
has the most to say about modes of viewing and target audiences. This is reﬂected
in rising marketing budgets: in 2008, Hollywood Majors were said to be spending
approximately one third of a ﬁlm’s budget, around $36 million, on marketing a big
budget ﬁlm, more in the case of huge blockbusters.
In his book Show Sold Separately, Jonathan Gray argues that in the cross-platform
digital age, marketing para-texts, the online and oﬄine promotion and publicity
materials, the tie-ins, the merchandising, increasingly ‘create [ﬁlm] texts, they
manage them, and they ﬁll them with many of the meanings that we associate with
them’ (Gray 2010: 6). If there is a triangular relationship between the ﬁlm, the
audience and the industry, Gray argues, then it is the para-texts that ‘ﬁll the space
between them … negotiating or determining interactions’ (Gray 2010: 23). A
case in point is the humble trailer. In a world of converging technologies, the
trailer of old is no more. It now occupies a very central role in the promotional
packaging of a ﬁlm. Besides ﬁlm companies setting up individual websites to pro-
mote any new releases, many digital TV providers now oﬀer free VOD movie
trailers. The social network sites (e.g., YouTube and Facebook) also circulate trai-
lers and previews. However, Gray goes on to propose a rather depressing scenario
for the ﬁlmmaker: that with an ever-increasing viewing of para-texts on/oﬄine
comes an ever-increasing dissolution of the meaning of the ﬁlm itself, with
the marketing texts replacing it. This is bound to consolidate power even more in
the hands of marketing persons who ‘pre-purpose and repurpose’ the endeavours
of directors (Gray 2010: 71–72).
Yet, fans also create their own para-texts: ‘criticism and reviews, fan ﬁction
[associated with particular ﬁlms/ genres], fan ﬁlm and video (vids) … fan art,
spoilers, fan sites’ (Gray 2010: 143). These audience-generated para-texts can either
be ‘on message’ or not, for audiences are very creative when it comes to the
business of subverting the meaning of studio product. They can create ‘their own
genres, genders, tones and styles’, carving out for themselves and others alternative
paths through movie texts (Gray 2010: 143). Eventually, however, ﬁnancial power
tends to win out. Any audience para-texts that ﬁnd a wider audience will
eventually get assimilated by the industry. This has happened time and time
again, particularly with fan sites. Mainstream culture has an uncanny knack of
absorbing marginal ‘voices’ to reinvigorate itself, to make itself more acceptable to
its target audience. And when that audience, by and large, is young, this is parti-
cularly important for credibility. This is how hegemonic power works: ideological
control by consent, not through force. Ideas that are generated outside tend to be
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absorbed as fully integrated creative technologies by the industry very quickly
(Huyssen 1986: 15).
Case study 7: Harry Potter and the Deathly Hallows Part 2
(2011) – Harry Potter as the quintessential contemporary
brand
1997 saw the UK publication of the ﬁrst Harry Potter book by J. K. Rowling,
Harry Potter and the Philosopher’s Stone. By 1999, and the publication of the second
in the series, Harry Potter and the Prisoner of Azkaban, the Harry Potter cult was
born. ‘By the third book you had queues [at booksellers], and by the fourth it was
starting to feel like those stories of people lining the docks in New York for the
next instalment of Dickens’s David Copperﬁeld. Harry Potter was a game changer. It
changed publishing’ (Jon Howells of Waterstone’s Booksellers, cited in Hoyle
2011: 4). Harry Potter changed more than publishing: the promotion of the books,
the ﬁlm franchise and now the e-books have been an object lesson in cross-
platform branding in an era of convergence, with its storytelling myths going viral
seemingly ‘at the click of a mouse’ (Aspden 2011: 11).
By 2001, the ﬁlm rights to the books had been acquired by Time Warner and
the ﬁrst in a planned series of ﬁlms was released, Harry Potter and the Sorcerer’s Stone
(US title). To promote the ﬁlm, Time Warner set up a ‘marketing council’ with
AOL, at the time under the same corporate umbrella, to facilitate a synergy of
marketing talents across the multimedia conglomerate. Lateral integration of dif-
ferent corporate entities, such as Time Warner and AOL, can extend the global
reach of production/marketing/sales/distribution systems of multi-media con-
glomerates. By deﬁnition, it casts a much wider net of power and control over the
marketplace than vertical integration, as witnessed in the Studio Era. For Harry
Potter and the Sorcerer’s Stone, Time Warner companies handled US TV/cable/
satellite promotion (HBO and Warner’s networks), the music (issued on Warner
Music’s Atlantic Records label) and print media promotion (Time Warner’s print
media empire). AOL, in turn, handled online merchandising (with 90 licensing
partners and 700 products), ticket promotions and giveaways (linked to AOL
subscriptions) (Grimes 2001: 17).
Since 2001, the further ﬁlm adaptations and the Time Warner branding have
helped to spur on book sales, and Harry Potter has grown to become one of the
world’s most widely recognized brands. Stephen Brown in his book Wizard! Harry
Potter’s Brand Magic (2005), identiﬁes the answer to this success in the pillars which
drive the brand: the stories themselves. In the branding of Harry Potter, marketing
persons have exploited the fundamental power of the parables themselves, the
myths. This world of Harry Potter is full of ‘hocus pocus, good versus evil, a
wizard with a big white beard, a baddie, the game of Quidditch, a hairy funnyman
on a ﬂying motorbike. And to top it all, a troll … ”snotting” all over Harry’s
wand’ (Barbara Ellen cited in Hoyle 2011: 5). These story elements act as a catalyst
for any developing brand story, stories feeding oﬀ stories again and again. The
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Time Warner marketing machine has always been sensitive to this. From 2001
to 2011, the cross-platform promotional strategy was designed to promote the ﬁlms
as a developing series and with it a brand that was growing and changing at the
same time in the minds of the public. This avoided audience ennui early on in the
series.
For the eighth, and ﬁnal, ﬁlm in the series, Harry Potter and the Deathly Hallows
Part 2 (2011), the promotion shifted away from the developing-story strategy of
previous movies to a focus on the one central marketing point of this last ﬁlm: to
‘move’ the audience towards the conclusion of the tale, the ﬁnal duel between
Harry and Voldemort. To this end, ubiquitous in the marketing materials, was one
tag line: ‘It all ends 7.15’, referencing the release date of 15 July 2011. The oﬃcial
website also included a link to an iPhone app that consumers could use to trade
spells with each other. This isn’t to say that marketing materials for the campaign
didn’t also refer to earlier campaigns. Posters and banners (released from 28 March
2011), trailers (from 27 April 2011), TV commercials and online promotion all
referred back to the logotype of the ﬁrst ﬁlm, the Harry Potter lightning ﬂash.
Such was the success of the promotion campaign that the ﬁlm took more money
than any other in its opening weekend, $168.8 million in the US/Canada sector
and $307 million elsewhere, including $36.6 million in the UK (Kaufman 2011).
But the Harry Potter promotion story doesn’t end there. One month before the
release of Harry Potter and the Deathly Hallows Part 2, J. K. Rowling announced a
move to e-books with the launch of a website Pottermore to handle distribution.
She had sensibly retained the digital rights to her books and hence was now free to
exploit them as e-books. As a strategist, J. K. Rowling has been brilliant. The
multimedia conglomerates helped to build up and sustain her brand. Now she
leaves them behind. She has even excluded other online stores, such as Amazon
and Apple, from selling her e-books. Are we witnessing a successful assault on the
power brokers of the media entertainment sector? Maybe, but a word of caution:
global media conglomerates have a long history of acquiring successful ‘Indepen-
dents’ to expand operations and to knock out the competition. One is left wondering
if Pottermore will be one more corporation to add to that statistic.
Case study 8: Paranormal Activity (2007) and no-budget
marketing
Earlier I mentioned the nudge factor, leverage, where ﬁlm companies try to drum
up excitement to build an audience. Social media sites are the main conduit for
facilitating this nudge factor today and the marketing history of Paranormal Activity
makes that point very clearly. This digital ﬁlm had virtually no budget ($10,000)
but was eventually picked up by Paramount, who thought that audiences might
respond to the ﬁlm if they could only see it. The promotion budget was kept very
low, with marketing directed online.
Amy Powell, Paramount’s executive vice president of interactive marketing
strategies, was given the ﬁlm to market. Everything about the campaign was
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designed to cost as little as possible but to aﬀect the best possible result (Keane
2010). The website featured video comments by horror fans, rather than estab-
lished critics, so that punters could dialogue with their peers. Written quotes from
the Vox pops were then targeted at colleges, a likely audience for such an inde-
pendent, no-budget horror ﬁlm. In no time at all the talking-heads videos and the
quotes went viral, since each piece of content had a social sharing element. Twitter
was also used to post the latest ‘sound bite’ info on the ﬁlm, at the time the longest
on-going Paramount posting on Twitter. Here Amy Powell’s team really excelled
because the Paramount postings occurred late at night, after general Twitter activ-
ity had trailed oﬀ and on-line insomniacs were looking for something to engage
with. As the excitement for the ﬁlm mounted, audiences were nudged online to
‘demand’ that the ﬁlm be screened in such-and-such a theatre. The campaign was
neatly summarized by the ﬁlm’s sales agent, Stuart Ford, as follows: ‘You like it so
much? You want it? Then demand it! Tell us where you want it and we’ll play it
there!’ (cited in Maher 2009: 3).
Paramount listened keenly to its online audience, and the subsequent roll-out
exhibition strategy, starting with a limited US run on 25 September 2009 at
12 screens in college towns, followed by a wide national release on 16 October
2009, worked brilliantly. The ﬁlm went on to gross $193 million worldwide at the
box oﬃce (IMDb).
Case study 9: Gwyneth Paltrow – celebrity lifestyle guru for
the Internet age?
In an age of information overload, consumers appear to be cutting to the chase
and aligning themselves ‘with a personality who thinks like them and can
make recommendations’ (Jacobs 2011: 1). Now, more than ever, ‘the “real world”
becomes constituted in terms derived from the “star world”’ (Tudor 1974: 83).
In his book Stars, Richard Dyer (1979) postulates that the star-persona is
constructed by the industry through four categories of ‘text’: the ﬁlms in which
they appear, the critical reviews, the promotional materials and free publicity.
If this remains generally true, in recent years celebrities have been aﬀorded a
space to break free somewhat of the constraints imposed on them by media con-
glomerates. Social media sites that they set up themselves oﬀer them more
control over their personae and aﬀord them a more ‘direct’ connection with their
audiences.
Gwyneth Paltrow is a case in point. In 2008 she set up www.goop.com to oﬀer
advice under the tagline ‘Nourish the inner aspect’. To date, Goop.com has signed
up 150,000 subscribers who log on for advice under the headings: Make, Go, Get,
Do, Be and See. The game plan would appear to be for Paltrow to make money
from her online brand by ‘transform[ing] followers into customers, through pro-
duct lines, advertising and e-commerce’ (Jacobs 2011: 1). In the far-oﬀ days of the
Marilyn logotype, such (relative) economic control was unimaginable for a star due
to the industry’s stranglehold over promotion and publicity. This is all well and
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good; but at the end of the day, the website is still about making money at the
consumers’ expense.
Case study 10: The Guardian newspaper in 2011 – building a UK
audience through cross-platform state-of-the-art applications
(Based on an interview with Robert Ingram-Smith, head of international business
development at The Guardian, London, 5 July 2011)
This case study has been chosen because it neatly summarizes recent convergence
strategies by a media organization whose ﬁngers are in many pies and whose
website, Guardian Online, now has 52 million unique users per month, one third in
the UK, one third in the US and one third in the rest of the world. The strategic
moves made by The Guardian in recent years are clear evidence of a shift to cross-
platform exploitation, to a move beyond a news perspective, and to engage with
young audiences for whom the pecking order is the mobile phone ﬁrst, then digital
(PCs/ MACs), then print. As I write, The Guardian is working on a consortium
‘ﬁlm’ pilot project called Interesting Stuﬀ. The project is based in Cornwall and
south-west England, and harnesses digital technologies to deliver combinations of
ﬁlm, arts and editorial content to audiences in social venues, on mobile phone
devices and in the home. Some research and development funds have been
made available through the European Union Media Programme. The Guardian
partners for Interesting Stuﬀ are Twofour (based in Plymouth), working in TV/ﬁlm
production, broadcast media and educational resources; media interests in Italy,
Denmark and the Czech Republic, providing ﬁlm content for the pilot; and
Golant Media Ventures (London based), the engineers of the project, responsible
for knitting together all the parties involved. The heart of the project is exploring
solutions for delivering ﬁlm and ancillary content cross-platform.
The editor of The Guardian has coined the term ‘mutualisation of content’ to
describe The Guardian’s policy of collating content in the era of convergence. Each
Guardian journalist is eﬀectively a content curator, collating, for example, the most
interesting blogs and Facebook pages in their subject for Guardian readers and
audiences online. In many senses, Interesting Stuﬀ is best understood as a manifes-
tation of this curatorial role. The Guardian’s function in the pilot is to bundle up
packages of content from inside or outside the organization that are essentially
supplementary reading either ahead of, or after, watching the ﬁlm. A ﬁlm set in
Cornwall, for instance, might be assembled as a package with a whole raft of
content that is about Cornwall, or about the author of the book on which the ﬁlm
is based, or interviews with actors who have appeared in the ﬁlm. The Guardian
might arrange to screen the ﬁlm in a social venue and, ahead of time, direct pun-
ters to a portal page who will then pull down content that sits outside the ﬁlm. It’s
rather like a tie-in, but taken to the next level. And what are the commercial
advantages to be had for The Guardian? Firstly, if the audience is large enough for
Interesting Stuﬀ, The Guardian can charge higher advertising rates; secondly, the
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corporate marketing people can then make capital from the increased visibility of
The Guardian brand.
Conclusion
This chapter has been a reﬂection on how the ﬁlm industry has promoted itself
since the Studio Era. During the 1930s and 1940s, power was consolidated around
ﬁve vertically integrated Majors who largely controlled the marketing of ﬁlm.
Later, in the TV Era, the Majors maintained a grip on ﬁlm promotion through
their reconﬁguration into ﬁnanciers-cum-distributors and by eventually linking up
with other media, especially TV. In fact, by the 1980s, the concept of the auton-
omous ﬁlm company was a thing of the past, with the Majors by now absorbed
into much larger, laterally integrated, multi-media empires. This is the point at
which we see the explosion of multi-platform marketing and distribution of ﬁlm.
In the Digital Era of online technologies, the opportunities aﬀorded by cross-
platform marketing and promotion have increased exponentially. In this new
digital world, marketing has gone ‘viral’. Much is made of the democratization that
the Internet has brought. This may be true in terms of audience interactivity and
agency, but at the same time lifestyle ideals have moved from the movie theatre, to
the TV, to the DVD, to the PC, to the Smartphone.
The mainstream ﬁlm industry has always been driven by an ethos of spinning
dreams for proﬁt; but now ego-ideals are fed to us through a plethora of marketing
avenues undreamed of a few decades ago. If ‘ethical’ multi-media groups such as
The Guardian, owned by a charitable trust, can be relied upon to keep in check the
worst excesses of promotional culture, others cannot. In those cases, consumers are
ever vulnerable to the new digital onslaught of viral commodity fetishism.
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